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Over the last two decades, there has been a major switch in British workplaces
away from union voice and representative worker voice more generally,
towards direct, non-union forms of voice. This paper assesses the implica-
tions of this switch for the effectiveness of worker voice, as measured by
employee perceptions of managerial responsiveness. In general, perceptions
of management are no better among employees with voice than they are
among employees with no voice. However, intensive use of direct communi-
cation methods improves perceptions of management. Direct voice is
particularly effective in a union setting.Introduction
When Richard Freeman and James Medoff wrote their seminal work What
Do Unions Do? (1984) nearly two decades ago, they identified two mecha-
nisms by which people dealt with problems they faced at work: ‘exit’,
whereby workers leave less desirable for more desirable jobs, and ‘voice’,
whereby workers use ‘direct communication to bring actual and desired
conditions closer together’ (1984: 8).
In both the United States and Britain, the most established mechanism for
voicing the concerns and opinions of workers to management is representa-
tion by trade unions. Freeman and Medoff argued this was for good reason.
They maintained that for worker voice to be ‘effective’ in delivering for
workers it needed to be ‘collective’ rather than ‘individual’ for two reasons.
First, ‘the danger of job loss makes expression of voice by an individual risky.
Collective voice, by contrast, is protected both by the support of all workers
and by the country’s labor law’ (1984: 9). Consequently, where voice is deliv-
ered through representatives backed by a group of workers, those workers
can express their concerns without the fear of reprisal. Secondly, collective
voice creates the incentive for individuals to make the effort to change their
working environment in a way that individual voice does not. As the authors
point out, many of the goals pursued by workers are public goods, that is:
‘goods which will affect the well-being (negatively or positively) of
every employee in such a way that one individual’s partaking of the
good does not preclude someone else from doing so… Without a collec-
tive organisation, the incentive for the individual to take into account
the effects of his or her actions on others, or to express his or her prefer-
ences, or invest time and money in changing conditions, is likely to be
too small to spur action’ (1984: 8–9).
Of course, not all representative voice is trade union voice. In Britain, for
example, many workplaces have joint consultative committees of managers
and employees that sit to discuss issues of common concern. They differfrom unions in two important respects. First, they are primarily concerned
with consultation, rather than negotiation over terms and conditions.
Secondly, they are not independent of management in the way that trade
unions are.1 The same might be said of other non-union forms of represen-
tative voice, such as non-union employee representatives.2 However,
according to Freeman and Medoff, voice must be independent of manage-
ment if it is to challenge effectively managerial prerogatives and deliver for
workers:
‘In the absence of unionism, the worker has limited responses to orders
that he feels are unfair: the worker can quit, or he can perhaps engage
in quiet sabotage or shirking, neither of which is likely to alter the
employer’s actions. In the union setting, by contrast, the union consti-
tutes a source of worker power, diluting managerial authority and
offering members protection through both the ‘industrial jurisprudence’
system, under which many workplace decisions are based on rules (such
as seniority) instead of supervisory judgement or whim, and the griev-
ance and arbitration system, under which disputes over proper
managerial decision making on work issues can be resolved. As a result,
management power within enterprises is curtailed by unionism, so that
workers’ rights are likely to be better enforced’ (1984: 11).
At the time Freeman and Medoff wrote their book, one might have been
forgiven for equating union voice with worker voice. However, since then, in
common with much of the rest of the industrialised world, British workplace
industrial relations has changed fundamentally. The essence of this change
has been a progressive decline in the system of collective relations whereby
management and unions jointly regulated workplace relations through volun-
tary collective bargaining, and its replacement by arrangements set largely at
the behest of management. At the very heart of this transformation has been
a major shift in the nature of worker voice (Table 1).
Since 1984, there has been little change in the proportion of workplaces
without worker voice, the figure remaining at about one in every six.
However, between 1984 and 1998 there was a steep decline in voice arrange-
ments where unions formed the single channel of communication (union-only
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1 In Britain, the Government’s Certification Officer establishes whether trade unions are truly
independent of employers as defined in Section 5 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992. If so, they are issued with a certificate of independence in
accordance with Section 6 of the Act.
2 Some employer-specific bodies, known as staff associations, do attain independent status,
whereupon there is little to distinguish them from trade unions.voice), and a less marked decline in ‘dual-channel’ voice involving union and
non-union channels in combination. These two changes were offset by a steep
increase in voice arrangements that did not involve unions.
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Table 1:  Changes in worker voice arrangements, 1984 to 1998
Column percentages
Type of voice arrangement  1984 1990 1998
(5 items)
Union only  24 14 9
Union and non-union 42 39 33
Non-union only 16 28 40
Voice, but nature not reported 2 * *
No voice 16 19 17
Representative voice only 29 18 14
Representative and direct voice 45 43 39
Direct voice only 11 20 30
Voice, but nature not reported 0 * *
No voice 16 19 17
Weighted base 2,000 1,997 1,991
Unweighted base 2,019 2,059 1,920
Type of voice arrangement (7 items)
Union only  .. 11 6
Union and non-union .. 42 37
Non-union only 33 46
Voice, but nature not reported .. * *
No voice 14 11
Representative voice only .. 15 10
Representative and direct voice .. 48 46
Direct voice only 23 33
Voice, but nature not reported * *
No voice .. 14 11
Weighted base .. 1,996 1,995
Unweighted base .. 2,058 1,923
Source: adapted from Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000), Tables 4.13 and 4.15. 
Key: .. = not available; * = under 1per cent. Base: all workplaces with 25 or more employees. Union
voice defined as one or more trade unions recognised by employers for pay bargaining or a joint
consultative committee meeting at least once a month with representatives chosen through union
channels. Non-union voice defined as a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month
with representatives not chosen through union channels, regular meetings between senior manage-
ment and the workforce, briefing groups, problem-solving groups, or non-union employee
representatives. Note that the last two measures were not available in 1984.Table 1 also clearly demonstrates that the shift has been away from repre-
sentative voice towards direct forms of voice.3 Between 1984 and 1998, the
proportion of workplaces with only representative voice arrangements halved,
while those with solely direct voice mechanisms more than doubled. Both
union and non-union representative voice have declined over the period, so
that the increase in non-union voice is wholly accounted for by the rise of
direct voice.
For the 1990s, we are able to gain considerable insight into how these
changes occurred through the analysis of panel data for workplaces which
survived over the period (continuing workplaces), coupled with data on
workplace closures and new workplaces.4 When discussing the issue of
workplace transformation, most commentators focus on behavioural change
within continuing workplaces. This is a very important factor in understand-
ing change in Britain during the 1990s, since workplaces that had been in
existence since 1990 accounted for 72 per cent of all workplaces in 1998
(Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 8). However, change may also occur
through compositional change, whereby workplaces entering the population
differ from leavers and continuing workplaces.
During the 1990s, the decline in union-only voice was largely accounted
for by continuing workplaces switching from single-channel union represen-
tation to dual-channel arrangements (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000:
124–125).5 In fact, the large-scale adoption of non-union voice within
unionised workplaces has been apparent since the first half of the 1980s
(Table 2). This may reflect an increasing desire on the part of employers to
deal with employees directly, rather than with unions. Certainly, this was a
view expressed by over half (54 per cent) of managers in unionised
workplaces in 1998.6 There is no evidence that managers were intentionally
introducing direct communication methods to undermine union influence.
On the contrary, ‘the addition of direct forms of participation was just as
likely among workplaces where management actively encouraged union
membership as it was among workplaces in which management gave no active
encouragement to unionism’ (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 126).
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3 Our ‘direct voice’ measure incorporates team briefings, regular meetings between senior
management and the workforce, and problem-solving groups, including quality circles, all of
which provide opportunities for two-way communication between workers and management.4
For a full description of these data see Millward, Bryson and Forth (2000: 248-255).
5 It was very rare for continuing workplaces to deunionise, replacing union voice with non-
union voice or no voice at all (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 125).
6 Compared to 86 per cent in non-unionised workplaces. These figures are based on manager-
ial respondents to the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 in all workplaces with 10 or
more employees.Nevertheless, it seems likely that the widespread adoption of alternative voice
mechanisms in unionised workplaces has the potential to undermine union
influence, albeit inadvertently.8 Indeed, if one assumes that unions view non-
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Table 2:  Union and non-union voice arrangements in unionised
workplaces, 1984 to 1998
Column percentages
Type of voice arrangement (5 items) 1984 1990 1998
Union only  35 26 21
Union and non-union 63 73 78
Voice, but nature not reported 2 1 1
Representative voice only 40 29 25
Representative and direct voice 60 71 74
Voice, but nature not reported 0 * 1
Weighted base 1327 1053 845
Unweighted base 1593 1416 1116
Type of voice arrangement (7 items)
Union only  .. 22 13
Union and non-union .. 78 85
Voice, but nature not reported .. 1 1
Representative voice only .. 24 15
Representative and direct voice .. 76 84
Voice, but nature not reported .. 0 1
Weighted base .. 1053 845
Unweighted base .. 1416 1116
Base: all workplaces with 25 or more employees recognising unions for pay bargaining.7 Union voice
is defined as one or more recognised trade unions or a joint consultative committee meeting at least
once a month with representatives chosen through union channels. Non-union voice defined as a
joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month with representatives not chosen through
union channels, regular meetings between senior management and the workforce, briefing groups,
problem-solving groups, or non-union employee representatives. Note that the last two measures
were not available in 1984.
7 The weighted number of workplaces with recognised unions is greater using time-series data
than the weighted number using the WERS98 cross-section (discussed later) because the time-
series weights inflate the weighted bases to 2000.
8 Two large nationally-representative surveys of employees in Britain in the mid-1980s and
early 1990s offer ‘some support for the view that direct participation has the indirect effect of
reducing employees’ sense of the necessity of union membership’ (Gallie, White, Cheng and
Tomlinson, 1998: 109).union voice as a potential threat, the presence of dual-channel voice may
signal the presence of weak unionism.9
The increase in solely non-union voice arrangements between 1990 and
1998 was accounted for by new workplaces adopting direct communication
methods. They were much more likely to have solely non-union voice than
continuing workplaces and those which had left the population in the 1990s
(Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 124–125). However, new workplaces
were clearly committed to retaining two-way communication channels since
the proportion with no voice channels was not significantly different to other
workplaces. These trends point to a conscious decision to adopt direct
communication methods in preference to union-based representation. Since
new workplaces account for the increase in non-union only voice, it is likely
that it will become even more prevalent in British workplaces in future.10
Irrespective of the underlying reasons for the growth in non-union and
direct voice, from Freeman and Medoff’s perspective we would expect direct
voice to be less effective than union voice, and representative voice in general,
in ensuring that management is responsive to employees. This is the proposi-
tion we examine in this paper using matched employer-employee data from
the 1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey. Section Two outlines
the hypotheses tested. Section Three introduces our data. Section Four outlines
the method of analysis. Section Five presents results and Section Six concludes.
HYPOTHESES
First hypothesis: For voice to be effective in delivering public good-type
outcomes it needs to be representative as opposed to direct voice.
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9 Certainly, union involvement in strategic decision-making, which has characterised wholesale
transformation of industrial relations in large American corporations (Kochan, Katz and
McKersie, 1986; Walton, 1987), has been rare in Britain (Storey, 1992: 139).
10 That said, statutory changes may also increase the incidence of representative voice. For the
first time in Britain since the early 1970s, there is a statutory mechanism for establishing union
recognition. It came into force under the Employment Relations Act 1999 on 6 June 2000.
However, some question whether this can reverse union decline (Millward, Bryson and Forth,
2000: 235-236). Some suggest that the procedures suffer from similar shortcomings to those
governing the establishment of workplace unions in the United States (Wood and Godard,
1999). In any event, the legislation does not extend to the smallest workplaces with fewer than
21 employees. The other potential source of statutory change is the European Union. Although
the European Works Council Directive has encouraged the growth of consultative machinery in
larger multiple-establishment organisations, it has yet to have a pervasive influence on the
extent of consultative arrangements in Britain (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 113). We have already outlined Freeman and Medoff’s reasons why this might be
so. Of course, there are contrary views, and these have come to dominate the
management literature since the mid-1980s. There are perhaps two key
themes in this literature. First, there is the suggestion that worker representa-
tion, rather than efficiently and effectively communicating workers’ wishes
and concerns to management, may actually create a barrier between manage-
ment and workers. This barrier can be breached if management eschews
intermediaries and deals directly with employees, either on a one-to-one basis,
or in groups (Storey, 1992; Peters, 1988; Lawler, 1986). Secondly, there is the
concept of treating workers as individuals, rather than as a collective. If one
recognises that the wishes and needs of workers are, in fact, heterogeneous,
management may be better able to understand them and respond to them
through direct voice channels (Storey, 1992; Lawler, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994).
Second hypothesis: For voice to be effective in adjusting employer behaviour
it must be union voice as opposed to non-union voice.
For Freeman and Medoff, effective worker voice requires management to
‘give up power and accept a dual-authority channel within the firm. Such a
change in power is difficult to attain in the absence of a genuine independent
union or union-like organisation … if management gives up power, it creates
the seeds of genuine unions; if it doesn’t, employee representation plans may
be mere window-dressing’ (1984: 108).11
An alternative to this hypothesis is our first hypothesis, in which case the
effectiveness of voice depends upon how representative it is, rather than
whether or not it is union voice. The issue is whether non-union representa-
tives are as effective as union ones, and whether joint consultative committees
can influence management in the way that unions may be able to. Recent
British research into collective forms of representation in non-union firms
points to the apparent powerlessness of collective non-union representation
(Terry, 1999: 28), arising in part from the lack of legal protection afforded to
non-union representatives when organising opposition to their employer.
However, if as Freeman and Medoff (1984: 18) suggest, the legitimacy of
union representatives derives in part from the mandate they are given as elected
representatives, one might expect similarly elected non-union representatives
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11 This perspective does not necessarily entail a zero-sum conception of management-worker
interests in which one side’s gain is the other’s loss. Some view a strong and independent
worker voice as a prerequisite for dual allegiance to union and employer, an allegiance which
can result in increased organisational loyalty, commitment, and ultimately a better industrial
relations climate (Marshall, 1992; Dastmalchian, Blyton and Adamson, 1991).to have greater impact than their unelected counterparts, some of whom will
be chosen by management. We test for these differences in our analyses.
In any case, can we really be sure that unions do exert influence over
management in the way they may have done in the early 1980s? Their ability
to do so rests on their representation of the bulk of workers in workplaces
where they are present. Yet, over the last two decades, declines in union density
and collective bargaining coverage have severely weakened unions even in
those workplaces where they continue to be recognised by employers for pay
bargaining (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 138–145; 159–167). This has
led to conjecture that British unions have become a ‘hollow shell’ with little or
no influence over management. Although the evidence is mixed, with unions
still able successfully to challenge managerial decision making in the late 1990s
(Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 173–177), it seems likely that union
effects will vary according to union strength on the ground. At one extreme,
moribund unions may play little role in setting the bargaining agenda and
have no representatives to act as the workers’ voice.12 At the other extreme,
there will be those unions who, perhaps with management support, have full-
time representatives operating as very effective voice mechanisms. We
incorporate these and other features of union (and non-union) voice to identify
differential effects across variants of our main voice types.
Third hypothesis: Union voice is better than non-union voice at representing
the preferences of less marketable workers to management, so we would
expect these workers to have more positive perceptions of managerial respon-
siveness where union voice exists.
Freeman and Medoff (1984: 9) argue that ‘the collective nature of trade
unionism fundamentally alters the operation of a labour market and, hence,
the nature of the labour contract’. In a non-union setting, where exit-and-
entry is the predominant form of adjustment to problems (as opposed to
voice), employers’ concern is the marginal worker who may leave or be
attracted by small changes in conditions of employment. In a union setting,
all or most workers are represented, whether they are likely to leave or not. If
unions are better at representing less marketable workers, they may shift the
distribution of power between marginal and more permanent employees,
causing management to respond accordingly by taking greater account of the
‘average’ worker. We test this hypothesis by running models on sub-groups of
more and less marketable workers.
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12 One of the most striking developments in the 1990s has been the sudden appearance of a large
proportion of workplaces where unions were recognised for pay bargaining but where unions
were not actively involved in pay bargaining (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000: 160-167).Fourth hypothesis: The impact of non-union voice will differ across union
and non-union workplaces because non-union voice will be influenced by the
climate in which unions seek to represent all workers.
Although union and non-union voice are often viewed as substitutes for one
another, in practice they exist together in the majority of unionised
workplaces, as noted above. It may be that the impact of non-union voice
will differ across unionised and non-unionised workplaces. As Storey (1992:
43) notes, ‘if HRM [human resource management] is primarily pursued on
an individualistic plane, the reaction from trade union representatives and
union members might be expected to play a not inconsiderable part in the
success or otherwise of such an approach’. But just how direct and non-union
representative voice may affect managerial responsiveness to employees in a
union setting is an empirical question. If, as Freeman and Medoff suggest, the
labour contract is fundamentally altered in the presence of trade unions, non-
union voice may be better able to accommodate the needs of the average
worker than in the non-union environment. Union and non-union voice may
prove complementary, particularly if union coverage is not total and non-
union voice can help ‘fill the gap’ for non-members. It may also be
complementary in the sense that the concerns addressed by non-union voice
can be quite different from those addressed by union voice, whereupon the
two channels may cover a wider spectrum of issues than one or the other
alone. In these circumstances, dual-channel voice may prove particularly
effective. On the other hand, if unions are intent on undermining non-union
voice, or management is committed to supporting non-union voice at the
expense of union voice, dual-channel voice may be particularly ineffective in
influencing management.
We address the effects of non-union voice in unionised and non-unionised
workplaces by running separate models for the two sectors, as well as testing
interactions in full sample models.
Fifth hypothesis: Unionised workers have poorer perceptions of management
due to ‘voice-induced complaining’.
It is a standard finding in the British and American literatures that unionised
workers express greater dissatisfaction with management than non-unionised
workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Gallie, White, Cheng and Tomlinson,
1998; Bryson, 1999). Freeman and Medoff’s exit-voice analysis offers an
explanation for this in the greater politicisation of unionised workers. They
suggest that unionised workers are more prone to express their voice ‘loudly’
to ensure that it is heard, resulting in ‘voice-induced complaining’ (1984:
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‘some of the critical attitude of the union workers is due to their greater
awareness of problems and willingness to speak out’ (1984: 142).13 As Gallie,
White, Cheng and Tomlinson (1998: 113–114) point out: ‘unionism as an
oppositional form of representation may highlight organisational inefficien-
cies and colour perceptions of management competence’. We test for this in
ways described in Section Four.
DATA
Our data are from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS).
It is the fourth in a series of nationally representative samples of British
workplace surveys conducted since 1980. However, it differs from its prede-
cessors in two important respects. First, it is representative of all workplaces
with ten or more employees, whereas the previous threshold was twenty-five
employees. Secondly, it contains a survey of employees drawn from the
surveyed workplaces. The analyses presented in Section Five use this matched
employer-employee data set, which consists of 28,215 employees drawn from
2,191 workplaces.
These data have a number of advantages. First, they are nationally repre-
sentative of British employees working in workplaces with ten or more
employees. Secondly, they are of very high quality. The surveys had high
response rates (80 per cent in the case of the workplace survey, and 64 per
cent in the case of the employee survey), giving us some confidence that the
data are representative of the populations from which they were drawn.14
Thirdly, rigorous piloting and developmental work and considerable post-
fieldwork data editing and checking assure data quality.15 Fourthly, the
combination of employee data on demographics, qualifications, job charac-
teristics, and attitudes to their job, management and unions, coupled with
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13 As Freeman and Medoff note (1984: 141), it is also the case that the stock of dissatisfied
workers will be greater in unionised workplaces because dissatisfied workers are less likely to
quit in unionised workplaces than they are in non-unionised workplaces (see, for example,
Bryson and McKay, 1997).
14 The primary sampling unit is the workplace. Workplaces were drawn as a stratified random
sample. Up to twenty-five employees were then drawn randomly from within these workplaces.
Where the workplace had twenty-five or fewer employees, all employees were selected. The
probability of worker selection is the product of the probability of the workplace being selected
and the probability of an employee being selected from within that workplace. See Cully,
Woodland, O’Reilley and Dix (1999: 306) for the advantages of this approach.
15 For full information on the design of the four surveys see Millward, Bryson and Forth
(2000) and for additional information on the design of the 1998 survey see Cully, Woodland,
O’Reilley and Dix (1999).workplace data obtained from the manager responsible for personnel or
human resource issues at the site, allows us to control for a very wide range
of individual-level and workplace-level information to estimate precisely
influences on managerial responsiveness to employees.
Measures of managerial responsiveness to employees
The survey of employees included a bank of questions that asked each
employee to provide a rating, on a five-point scale from ‘very poor’ to ‘very
good’, of how managers at their workplace were on five items: keeping people
up to date about proposed changes; providing everyone with the chance to
comment on proposed changes; responding to suggestions from employees;
dealing with work problems you or others may have; and treating employees
fairly. All five can be regarded as ‘public goods’ in that they affect the well
being of every employee in such a way that one individual’s partaking of the
good does not preclude someone else from doing so. They are therefore
appropriate for testing Freeman and Medoff’s propositions.
Although all five are correlated positively with one another, the correla-
tions are not sufficiently strong to suggest that employees simply went down
the list and ticked the same box in each case.16
Table 3 shows that there is quite a lot of variation in the distribution of
responses on the five items. Around half of employees think managers are
good or very good at treating employees fairly and dealing with employees’
work problems, but only a third think they are good or very good at respond-
ing to employees’ suggestions or providing everyone with a chance to
comment on changes.
Voice measures
Most of our analyses use two ‘voice’ typologies derived from information
obtained in the personnel manager interview: one that distinguishes between
union and non-union voice, and one that distinguishes between representa-
tive and direct voice.
Each composite variable consists of ‘voice’ mechanisms that have two
common features. First, they allow for the possibility of two-way communi-
cation between management and employees, giving employees the
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 17
16 For full information on the design of the four surveys see Millward, Bryson and Forth
(2000), and for additional information on the design of the 1998 survey see Cully, Woodland,
O’Reilley and Dix (1999)
17 One-way communication methods, such as systematic use of the management chain for
cascading information down to employees, are used as control variables in some models (see
below).opportunity to voice their wishes and concerns.17 Secondly, where they
depend upon intermittent forms of communication, the opportunity for voice
must occur regularly. Thus, team briefings are included only if they occur at
least once a month, and joint consultative committees are only included where
they meet at least once per quarter. This ensures that we do not underesti-
mate the impact of voice by including mechanisms that exist on paper but not
in practice.18
Table 4 shows the incidence of union and non-union voice among British
workplaces and their workers in 1998. Whereas there was no worker voice in
17 per cent of workplaces, only 7 per cent of employees had no access to
voice, reflecting the concentration of ‘no voice’ among smaller workplaces.
This is also true of non-union only voice which characterised almost half of
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Table 3:  Employees’ perceptions of management’s responsiveness and
fairness, 1998
Column percentages
How good  Keeping  Providing Responding Dealing Treating
would you  everyone  everyone to  with work  employees
say managers  up to date  with the  suggestions problems fairly
here are at… about chance to  from you or 
proposed comment employees others
changes on proposed  may have
changes
Very poor  10 14 12 8 9
Poor 20 25 22 16 13
Neither good 
nor poor 26 30 33 27 26
Good 34 25 27 39 39
Very good 10 7 6 10 13
Weighted 
base 28,222 26,917 26,557 27,121 27,217
Unweighted 
base 27,513 27,108 26,665 27,176 27,294
Base: all employees in workplaces with 10 or more employees who had non-missing data. 
18 This approach means that there are some workplaces categorised as having ‘no voice’ which
do have voice mechanisms that operate infrequently. This may understate the effects of having
no voice at all. We test the sensitivity of our results to alternative variable specifications, report-
ing differences where they are significant. We also test the effects of other voice variables
available, such as works councils and other consultation mechanisms operating at higher levels
in multiple-establishment organisations. The incidence of all the voice variables used in our
analyses are presented in Appendix Table A1.workplaces but around a third of employees.19 The majority of employees
work in workplaces with both union and non-union voice (‘dual-channel’
arrangements).
Table 5 shows the incidence of representative and direct voice. It is
notable that representative-only voice is twice as prevalent as union-only
voice. Direct voice-only accounts for over a third of workplaces, but a fifth of
employees, indicating a greater prevalence among smaller workplaces.
CONTROL VARIABLES
Our analyses control for a wide range of individual and workplace character-
istics to minimise estimation bias arising from omitted variables. To allow for
comparability across models, we use the same set of controls for each of the
five dependent variables.
Appendix Table A2 defines these variables and shows their incidence in
the sample, but we briefly introduce them here.
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Table 4:  Summary of union and non-union voice arrangements in 1998
Column percentages
Type of voice arrangement Workplaces Employees
Union voice only 5 5
Union and non-union voice 31 54
Non-union voice only 47 34
No voice 17 7
Weighted base 2,130 26,837
Unweighted base 2,089 26,812
Base: all workplaces with 10 or more employees; all employees in those workplaces. Excludes those
with missing data.
Note: union voice defined as having at least one of the following: one or more unions recognised by
the employer for pay bargaining; an on-site union representative; a joint consultative committee
meeting at least once a month with representatives chosen through union channels. Non-union voice
defined as having at least one of the following: an on-site non-union employee representative; a joint
consultative committee meeting at least once a month with representatives not chosen through union
channels; regular meetings between senior management and the workforce; briefings for a work
group, section, team or department which occur at least once a month and in which at least some
time is given over to questions from employees, or for employees to offer their views; groups that
solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality.
19 The distribution of workplace union/non-union voice is similar but not identical to that
shown in the lower panel of Table 1 for the time-series. The figures differ in some respects
because the cross-section data allow for a more elaborate classification and because the time-
series is confined to workplaces with 25 or more employees.Individual-level control variables
Demographic: our analyses incorporate gender, age and ethnicity, all of which
have been associated with employee perceptions of management in previous
studies (Bryson and McKay, 1997; Gallie, White, Cheng and Tomlinson,
1999). More highly educated workers often have higher expectations of
involvement, and may therefore be particularly critical of management where
participation is denied. We therefore include individuals’ highest educational
qualification, and whether they possess a vocational qualification.
Job-related characteristics: we control for five aspects of individuals’ jobs:
occupation (based on the 1990 Standard Occupational Classification); years
spent working at the workplace; hours usually worked each week; whether the
contract is a permanent one; and gross weekly wage. Together these variables
help capture an individual’s attachment to their workplace, the investment
they have made in working there, and their status in the organisation.
The twelve-category ordered variable capturing gross wages controls for
a well-known union effect which may confound the voice effect, namely the
union mark-up on wages. As Freeman and Medoff (1984: 94ff) note, union-
induced wage increases may make workers more positive about their working
environment than they otherwise would be, so confounding estimates of a
union-induced voice effect. Ordered probit models estimating gross wages
confirmed that there was a powerful wage mark-up effect attached to being a
union member.20
20 / Alex Bryson
Table 5:  Summary of representative and direct voice arrangements in 1998
Column percentages
Type of voice arrangement Workplaces Employees
Representative voice only 10 11
Representative and direct voice 36 61
Direct voice only 37 21
No voice 17 7
Weighted base 2,090 26,844
Unweighted base 2,091 26,803
Base: all workplaces with 10 or more employees; all employees in those workplaces. Excludes those
with missing data.
Note: Representative voice defined as having at least one of the following: one or more unions
recognised by the employer for pay bargaining; an on-site employee representative; a joint consulta-
tive committee meeting at least once a month. Direct voice defined as having at least one of the
following: regular meetings between senior management and the workforce; briefings for a work
group, section, team or department which occur at least once a month and in which at least some
time is given over to questions from employees, or for employees to offer their views; groups that
solve specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality.
20 These models are not shown. They are available from the author: a.bryson@psi.org.uk.Union membership status: we distinguish between current union
members, ex-members and individuals who have never been union members.
Controlling for individual union membership helps identify whether there is
voice-induced complaining among union members.
Workplace-level control variables
We use data obtained from the manager responsible for employee relations at
the workplace to control for workforce composition, sector, ownership,
location (region), the nature of the activity at the workplace, and personnel
practices.
Workforce composition: six variables capture the composition of the
workforce. Four of them (the percentage of employees who are women, the
percentage who are part-timers, the percentage who are managers, and the
percentage from non-white ethnic minorities) are the workplace-level
analogues of individual-level variables in the model. In addition, we include
the percentage of managers who are women to identify whether there is
anything distinctive about the style of women managers.21 The effectiveness
of different voice mechanisms is likely to vary with the number of workers
at the workplace. In smaller workplaces, where workers are in closer
proximity to the decision-making process, it may be more effective to
conduct employee relations face-to-face rather than through representation.
We have therefore included the total number of employees in the workplace
as a control variable.
Sector, ownership and location: Single-site and multi-site organisations
differ markedly in the way they manage employee relations, and across the
public and private sectors of the economy (Millward, Bryson and Forth, 2000:
61–80), so our models control for this. We also include industry dummies to
capture unmeasured industry differences. A twelve-category regional variable
captures workplace location.
Workplace activity: How responsive management is to its workforce may
depend, in part, on its exposure to a competitive market environment. Our
workplace activity variable distinguishes workplaces producing goods and
services for consumers, those supplying to other companies, those supplying
to other parts of the organisation they belong to, those that do not produce
goods or provide services for the open market, and those that are purely
administrative offices.
Management practices: Any positive effects of employee involvement on
firm performance may be upwardly biased if they are simply an indicator that
a workplace is well managed generally and no attempt is made to control for
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 21
21 This is a live debate in Britain at present (Wajcman, 1996).‘good management’ (Huselid and Becker, 1996). This is equally true with
respect to the impact of voice on employees’ perceptions of management. We
include three measures of management practice to account for this possibility.
First, a dummy variable identifying whether the workplace is covered by a
formal strategic plan which sets out objectives and how they will be achieved.
Secondly, a variable identifying whether the workplace or organisation to
which it belongs has been accredited as an Investor in People.22 Thirdly, we
include a variable identifying those workplaces with a formal written policy
on equal opportunities or managing diversity.
ANALYSIS
General modelling approach
To test the impact of voice measures on employee perceptions of management
responsiveness we run regressions on each of the five dependent variables
described in Section Three. Each variable is a categorical indicator defined in
terms of ordered responses, so use an ordered probit estimator. Each variable
runs from 1 (‘very poor’) to 5 (‘very good’), so that more positive coefficients
indicate more positive perceptions of managerial responsiveness.
The analysis takes account of the complex survey design. First, all models
are run on data weighted by the inverse of the employee’s sampling probabil-
ity. As well as allowing the results to be generalised to the population from
which the sample is drawn, the use of probability weights also guards against
estimation bias that can arise through differential sample selection probabili-
ties.23 Secondly, we employ the Huber-White robust variance estimator that
produces consistent standard errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity.24
Thirdly, we obtain accurate standard errors by taking account of sample strat-
ification and the non-independence of individual observations due to
clustering in the primary sampling units, namely workplaces.
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22 The Investors in People (IiP) award is given to workplaces or organisations by independent
assessors from Training and Enterprise Councils in England and Wales (Local Enterprise
Companies in Scotland) which have a planned approach to setting and communicating business
objectives and developing people to meet those objectives.
23 Differential sampling fractions can result in standard estimator biases (Skinner, 1997). The
weights account for all variation in samplilng probabilities, thus eliminating differential
sampling probability as a possible source of estimating bias.
24 The F statistic reported for each model is a Wald test based on the robustly estimated
variance matrix.Testing for voice-induced complaining
To test for voice-induced complaining among union members we do three
things. First, we establish whether it exists. We adopt the test proposed by
Freeman and Medoff (1984: 140–141), that is, we establish whether
unionised workers express greater dissatisfaction with aspects of their work
in spite of enjoying better work conditions. Secondly, we establish the impact
of various voice mechanisms on current union members, ex-members and
employees who have never been members by running separate models on
each group. Thirdly, we distinguish between union membership effects and
what might be termed the ‘workplace effect’ associated with the unionisa-
tion of a workplace by running models of four separate sub-samples:
members in workplaces where unions are recognised for pay bargaining;
non-members in workplaces recognising unions; members in workplaces
which do not recognise unions; and non-members in workplaces which do
not recognise unions.
Testing the sensitivity of results to different voice measures
It would be over simplistic to assume that all forms of direct voice perform
in a similar way, and that all forms of representative voice operate in a
similar way. Both voice types contain heterogeneous practices, sometimes
with quite different substantive emphases. For example, under the rubric of
direct voice we include problem-solving groups, in which employees are
personally involved in decisions going beyond their immediate work task,
and team briefings and meetings with senior management where employee
involvement is sought through better two-way communications.25 We disag-
gregate our voice measures to establish the contribution of individual
practices, and consider the effect of practices in combination to establish the
effectiveness of specific types of voice in addition to our generic types. We
also test the sensitivity of our results to alternative formulations of the voice
variables we construct, a process made possible by the richness of the WERS
data. Further sensitivity tests involved the addition of one-way communica-
tion methods from management down to employees. Although these do not
offer employees the opportunity to voice their views, they may nevertheless
have an impact on the degree to which workers view managers as responsive
to their needs.
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25 The former has been termed ‘direct participation’ and the latter ‘communicative
involvement’ (Gallie, White, Cheng and Tomlinson, 1998: 89).Limitations to our methodology
Voice mechanisms are not randomly distributed across workplaces. Take, for
example, unionisation: if there are what Freeman and Medoff (1984: 23)
term ‘pre-union differences’ between unionised workplaces (or individuals)
and non-unionised workplaces which are unobserved or unobservable that
sort them into or out of unionised status, and these differences are correlated
with the outcome of interest, then estimates of union voice effects will be
biased. As Freeman and Medoff put it: ‘This uncaptured ‘pre-union differ-
ence’ may explain part of the outcome difference that we attribute to
unionism’ (1984: 23). It is possible to account for these selection processes by
modelling the likelihood that a workplace will be unionised or not, for
instance. However, the selection problem is compounded in the case of
matched employee–employer data since there is possible sorting among
workplaces and among employees. Furthermore, we are testing the effect of a
wide range of voice mechanisms, so that seeking to control for selection into
each or all of them would become very complicated. In this paper we have
simply incorporated a wide range of factors that we know influence employee
perceptions of management to minimise the problem of omitted variables
bias. We also test whether our findings hold across sub-samples where we
might expect systematic differences in the association between voice and
perceptions of management (within the unionised and non-unionised sectors,
the public and private sectors, and among union members and non-members).
The cross-sectional nature of our data presents a second difficulty, namely
the direction of any causal link between voice and employee perceptions of
management responsiveness. Voice mechanisms may even be endogenous if
they are introduced in response to perceptions of management. For example,
management may introduce direct voice where it has identified communica-
tion difficulties between management and staff. If so, the model will
understate any positive association between direct voice and employee percep-
tions of management. Although endogeneity problems may be tackled
through instrumentation, we do not attempt this here. Instead, we simply
point to the relative durability of voice mechanisms over the eight years of
the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) Panel (Millward, Bryson
and Forth, 2000: 120–121). This gives us some confidence that our voice
measures predate individuals’ perceptions of management at the time of the
survey interview.
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Whole sample baseline models
Table 6 presents our baseline results for our two key voice typologies: models
for each of our five dependent variables using our representative versus direct
voice typology appear in the top half of the table, and the models using our
union versus non-union typology appear in the bottom half of the table.
Contrary to what we might have expected from Freeman and Medoff’s
perspective, single-channel direct voice was associated with better percep-
tions of managerial responsiveness than representative voice alone. This
finding is consistent with what we might have anticipated from the human
resource management literature referred to earlier. However, the combina-
tion of representative and direct voice is equally effective, pointing to
possible complementarity between these two voice mechanisms. It is clear
from the lower half of the table that the poor performance of representa-
tive voice only is due, in large part, to the negative effect of union voice
relative to non-union voice. Non-union only voice elicits more positive
attitudes to management than union-only voice on all but our ‘fair treat-
ment’ measure.
What neither the human resource management literature nor Freeman
and Medoff might have anticipated is that, in all but two instances, percep-
tions of management were no better among employees with voice than they
were among employees with no voice.27
Perhaps what matters most to employees is whether voice helps to make
their establishment a better place in which to work. One measure of this is
the employee rating of how good managers at their workplace are at treating
employees fairly. Yet on our ‘fair treatment’ measure the only significant
difference across voice arrangements was the higher rating among employees
in workplaces with a combination of representative and direct voice relative
to workplaces with representative voice only. Direct-only voice did not deliver
‘fair treatment’. Whether voice was union-only, non-union only or dual-
channel also made no significant difference. Furthermore, none of the voice
arrangements made a significant difference relative to having no voice. Thus,
on this crucial test, the ‘newer’ forms of voice performed no better than the
traditional union and representative methods.
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26 Copies of full models used for this paper are available from the author.
27 Managers were thought to be better at giving employees the chance to comment where
representative and direct voice were present in combination, and they were thought to be better
at dealing with employees’ work problems in the presence of non-union voice only. Both effects
were significant relative to no voice at a 10 per cent confidence level.Sensitivity tests
We undertook a number of sensitivity tests to see whether the whole sample
results were robust to alternative specifications. First, we added extra control
variables to the models. These included additional voice variables identifying
representative voice mechanisms beyond the immediate workplace (for
instance, works councils and consultative committees higher up in the organi-
sation, and employee representatives based off-site), as well as other
mechanisms such as suggestion schemes. They also included one-way commu-
nication methods that, although they offered no opportunity for workers to
voice their concerns, nevertheless provided means for management to commu-
nicate with workers (for example, systematic use of the management chain for
cascading information, regular newsletters, other types of meeting between
management and employees). Although some of these variables had significant
effects themselves,28 they had little impact on the voice effects reported above.
The main exception was a small increase in the non-union only voice coeffi-
cient in the ‘fair treatment’ model which resulted in it being positive and
significant at a 10 per cent confidence level relative to union-only voice (0.11,
t-stat = 1.84) and dual-channel arrangements (0.07, t-stat = 1.81).
It is common practice to exclude managerial employees from analyses of
employee views about management. We chose not to do this since, like other
employees, most will experience ‘being managed’ by others higher up in the
managerial hierarchy. However, because employees in managerial occupa-
tions were more positive about management responsiveness than other
employees (see Appendix Tables A3(a) and A3(b)), we tested the sensitivity of
our results to their exclusion from the models. Their exclusion made no differ-
ence to our results.
What is driving the effects observed?
To establish what was ‘driving’ the effects identified in the whole sample
models we broke up our voice typologies into their component parts, running
three additional sorts of models. First, we distinguished between union repre-
sentative voice, non-union representative voice, and direct voice, and
interacted them with one another to see whether interactions across these
voice categories revealed effects hidden by the typologies already discussed.
In nearly all instances, the interactions were not significant. Secondly, we
broke down the categories still further with dummy variables capturing the
26 / Alex Bryson
28 Most notably, newsletters were positively associated with higher management ratings on all






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.existence of each separate practice. We found that problem-solving groups
and regular meetings between senior management and the whole workforce
were positively and significantly associated with perceptions of managerial
responsiveness across all five measures.29 However, all direct voice mecha-
nisms were not equally effective: team briefings were not significantly
associated with our five measures.
Most representative voice variables were not significant, but there were
exceptions, the most notable being the negative effect of on-site union repre-
sentation in a workplace where the union was recognised for pay bargaining.
This effect was present for four of our five measures, the exception being
providing everyone with a chance to comment. This indicates that percep-
tions of managerial responsiveness were poorest where the union voice was
strongest. This finding, which is consistent with other British research on
employees’ attitudes to their working environment (Bryson, 1999), might be
the result of ‘voice-induced complaining’, which could be strongest where the
voice mechanism is most powerful. Yet the presence of an on-site full-time
union representative tended to be associated with positive perceptions of
management responsiveness when compared to perceptions among those with
on-site union representatives that were not full-time. Since full-time union
representatives tend to operate where employers support the role performed
by the union, this finding may reflect the influence of managerial attitudes
towards unions.30
Thirdly, the positive associations between perceptions of managerial
responsiveness and the combination of representative and direct voice raises
the question: since those with a voice combination tended to have a higher
number of voice mechanisms than those with a single channel, how impor-
tant is the number of voice channels in explaining employees’ perceptions of
management responsiveness? We found that perceptions of managerial
responsiveness were better among employees in workplaces with more non-
union channels and, in particular, with more direct methods of
communication. So, more intensive use of direct voice channels resulted in
28 / Alex Bryson
29 These effects are evaluated against the reference category of not having the practice (for
example, having a problem-solving group versus not having one) rather than against a baseline
of having no voice. Essentially, the finding is telling us that it is better to have these forms of
direct voice than not to have them. But, as noted above, Table 6 shows that the average effect
of having direct voice only (averaging across the three types of direct voice and the number
present in the workplace) is not significant relative to having no voice.
30 The main managerial respondent in 80 per cent of workplaces with full-time union represen-
tatives said they were in favour of union membership, compared to 27 per cent in unionised
workplaces without full-time union representatives.better employee perceptions of management’s ability to communicate and
respond to their concerns. The number of union channels and the number of
representative voice channels were generally not significant.31
Effects on ‘average’ and ‘marginal’ workers
Although there is no evidence to support the contention that union voice
delivers better results for workers in general, it may nevertheless be more
effective than non-union voice in delivering for ‘average’ workers as opposed
to ‘marginal’ workers, as Freeman and Medoff suggest. To test this, we
estimate the effect of union and non-union voice on groups of more and less
‘marketable’ workers, according to their tenure at the workplace, their age
and educational qualifications. Here we focus on perceptions of fair treat-
ment by management, but the broad thrust of the results holds for all five of
our dependent variables.
Table 7 presents results on five separate groups of workers, according to
the time they have been working at the workplace. If union voice is better
than non-union voice in representing the preferences of less marketable
workers, one would expect long-term stayers’ perceptions of management to
be better in the presence of union voice. In fact, there is little evidence of this.
Relative to no voice, union-only voice is not positively associated with percep-
tions of fair treatment for any group of workers, and its coefficients are
always more negative (less positive) than the coefficients for non-union only
voice. Although the union-only voice coefficients become steadily more
positive as we move from shorter to longer stayers, this is true for all voice
types.32 On the other hand, dual-channel voice involving a combination of
union and non-union voice does result in better perceptions of management
among the longest stayers with ten or more years service, whereas the associ-
ation is actually negative (at a 10 per cent confidence level) relative to the no
voice scenario, among the shortest stayers with less than a year’s tenure.
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31 The direct voice count variable, running from 0 to 3, produced significant linear effects in
most models. For example, with controls identical to those in Table 6, the voice effects for ‘fair
treatment’ were as follows (t-statistics in parentheses):
• Number of direct voice mechanisms (ref None): one: 0.05 (1.37), two: 0.08 (2.14), three:
0.13 (3.03).
• Number of union voice channels (ref None): one: 0.01 (0.22), two: –0.07 (1.91), three:
–0.03 (0.67)
• Presence of non-union representative voice (ref None): 0.01 (0.26).
32 This is an interesting result in its own right. As Appendix Tables 3(a) and (b) show, percep-
tions of management responsiveness deteriorate with increasing tenure. But Table 7 shows that



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The evidence is still weaker when distinguishing between more and less
marketable workers according to their age (Table 8). Although there is
evidence of union-only voice being particularly ineffective for the youngest
workers, there is no evidence of its effectiveness for older workers, many of
whom will be among the least marketable and least likely to leave for another
job. Indeed, there are no significant differences between the effects of differ-
ent types of voice for any of the three age groups.
A similar story emerges again when we cut the data into segments accord-
ing to individuals’ highest educational qualifications, a good proxy for
marketability (Table 9). Although non-union only voice delivers for the most
qualified, relative to having no voice, as might have been anticipated by
Freeman and Medoff, its effect is not significantly different from union-only
voice. Furthermore, union voice does not deliver for the least marketable.
Relative to no voice, union-only voice and dual-channel voice were positive
for the least and best qualified workers, but the differences were not statisti-
cally significant.
The ineffectiveness of union voice for ‘average’ workers as well as
marginal workers could result from unions’ inability to represent large
numbers of workers even where they are recognised for pay bargaining.
However, further analyses using union density as a proxy for union coverage
of workers revealed no differences in union effectiveness by density.
These analyses indicate that, contrary to Freeman and Medoff’s hypothe-
sis, union voice does not disproportionately benefit the ‘average’ or less
marketable workers. But neither does non-union voice.
Does non-union voice operate differently in union and non-union
workplaces?
We ran separate models for employees in the unionised and non-unionised
sectors to establish whether non-union voice has different effects on manage-
rial responsiveness in the two sectors. This approach is also valuable since
our non-union voice only and no voice scenarios are confined to the subset of
workplaces with no unions recognised for pay bargaining. Similarly, although
it was theoretically possible for workplaces without recognised unions to
have union-only voice,33 in practice observations with union-only voice all
came from the unionised sector.
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 31
33 This is because unions may be present in the workplace without being recognised by the
employer for pay bargaining. For example, they may have a union representative dealing with




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Among employees in non-unionised workplaces (Table 10), the three-
quarters with access to direct voice only, or a combination of direct and
representative voice, were significantly more positive about managerial
responsiveness than the small minority (one-in-twenty) with representative
voice only. More surprisingly, the one-sixth with no voice had more positive
perceptions of management’s ability to inform, consult and respond to sugges-
tions than those with representative voice only.
None of the representative and direct voice arrangements delivered fair
treatment in non-unionised workplaces. On this crucial measure, it appears
that employees in non-unionised workplaces had no effective voice.
Employees in non-unionised workplaces had particularly negative views
about management where there was union voice present, as the bottom half
of Table 10 indicates. On four of our five measures, perceptions of manage-
ment were significantly poorer where there was dual-channel communication
than where there was single-channel non-union voice. Even no voice
performed better than dual-channel arrangements in terms of keeping
employees up-to-date and offering them the chance to comment on proposed
changes. This may be a ‘weak’ union effect, whereby unions heighten aware-
ness of some of the shortcomings of management but, through lack of
recognition, have insufficient power to influence management.
These findings call into question the effectiveness of all voice mechanisms
in non-unionised workplaces since across all five measures, no voice arrange-
ments produce a significant improvement in perceptions of management
relative to having no voice. It is equally clear that in non-unionised
workplaces representative voice in isolation, and the combination of union
and non-union voice, result in poorer perceptions of management than direct
voice alone and non-union representative and direct voice combined.
In Table 11 we turn our attention to employees’ perceptions of manage-
ment in unionised workplaces. In common with employees in non-unionised
workplaces, those in unionised workplaces had better perceptions of manage-
ment where there was a combination of representative and direct voice as
opposed to representative voice alone. In particular, dual-channel arrange-
ments involving union and non-union voice performed better than
single-channel union-only voice. The effectiveness of dual-channel arrange-
ments, as measured by employee perceptions of management, may go some
way to explaining why these arrangements have become more prevalent in
the unionised sector since the 1980s, as illustrated in Table 2.
The results differ from those presented for the non-unionised sector in
two respects. First, dual-channel voice combining union and non-union
arrangements are generally more beneficial than single-channel arrangements.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Secondly, voice arrangements exist in the unionised sector that significantly
improve employees’ perceptions of fair treatment by management: these are
the arrangements combining representative and direct voice.34
To establish whether different types of direct voice operated differently in
unionised and non-unionised environments, we ran further models for the
two sectors identifying each practice separately. This revealed that the only
voice variable positively associated with perceptions of fairer treatment by
management in non-unionised workplaces was problem-solving groups.
These were also positively associated with perceptions of fairer treatment in
unionised workplaces, but so too were regular meetings between senior
management and the workforce. This finding suggests that aspects of direct
voice may operate more effectively in a unionised environment than a non-
unionised environment.
Are negative union effects accounted for by voice-induced 
complaining?
To establish whether ‘voice-induced complaining’ existed in our data we
tested whether unionised workers expressed greater dissatisfaction with four
aspects of their work available in WERS, in spite of enjoying better work
conditions. Freeman and Medoff note that ‘because most surveys obtain
information on workplace conditions from workers rather than from objec-
tive sources… such contrasts of worker perceptions and reality are few’
(1984: 140). However, we are fortunate in that we can measure ‘reality’ with
data on working conditions from employers matched to our employee data.35
As anticipated, union members had significantly higher scores on the non-pay
terms and conditions indicator than non-members.
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34 Although dual-channel union and non-union voice alone had positive coefficients relative to
union-only voice, neither was significantly associated with improved perceptions of fair treat-
ment. Further models disaggregating our composite voice variables indicated that two forms of
representative voice were negatively associated with fair treatment: the presence of a function-
ing joint consultative committee, and the presence of an on-site union representative. However,
the negative effects of consultative committees were ameliorated in cases where representatives
to joint consultative committees were elected by employees or appointed through union
channels, as opposed to volunteering or being appointed by management. This lends support to
the hypothesis that political processes legitimising worker representation in the eyes of employ-
ees may enhance its effectiveness. The negative effects of on-site union representation were not
apparent in the case of full-time representatives.
35 The variable we use counts the number of non-pay terms and conditions to which employ-
ees from the workplace’s largest occupational group are entitled from the following list:
employer pension scheme; company car or car allowance; private health insurance (which is
relatively rare in Britain); four weeks or more paid annual leave; sick pay in excess of statutory








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Employees were asked how satisfied they were with the following aspects
of their work:
• the amount of influence you have over your job;
• the amount of pay you receive;
• the sense of achievement you get from your work;
• the respect you get from supervisors/line managers.
We modelled responses that ranged along a five-point scale from ‘very satis-
fied’ to ‘very dissatisfied’. Having controlled for occupation, gross wage, and
the number of non-pay terms and conditions to which employees were
entitled, there was strong evidence of voice-induced complaining among non-
managerial employees from the largest occupational group in each workplace
(Table 12).
Union members were significantly less satisfied with all four aspects of
their work than employees who had never been members. In three of the
four models, current members had lower satisfaction rates than ex-members
did. The bottom half of the table distinguishes between members and non-
members working in workplaces with and without employer recognition of
the union for pay bargaining purposes. This allows us separately to identify
‘membership’ effects arising from individual union membership, and ‘recog-
nition’ effects arising from the unionisation of the workplace. There is
evidence of both effects, but the ‘membership’ effect is strong, and the ‘recog-
nition’ effect weak. The ‘recognition’ effect is evident in the lower
satisfaction scores among those in unionised workplaces compared to those
in non-unionised workplaces, controlling for membership status.36 The
‘membership’ effect is evident among workers in unionised workplaces in
the significantly lower satisfaction scores among members compared to non-
members in three of the four models. Among workers in non-unionised
workplaces, the ‘membership’ effect is confined to dissatisfaction with influ-
ence over one’s job.
Since ‘voice-induced complaining’ among union members is a feature of
our data, it is important to take it into account before concluding that the
negative impact of union voice on perceptions of management in our whole
sample models is due to union representation per se.
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36 However, the effect is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent confidence level in two
cases. Among non-members, those in workplaces with recognised unions had lower satisfaction
with achievement at work compared with those in non-unionised workplaces. Among members,
those in unionised workplaces were significantly less satisfied with respect from managers and



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 13 presents separate models for current union members, ex-
members and employees who have never been union members. The top half
of the table shows that members’ perceptions of management are significantly
more positive with direct voice-only than representative voice only across all
five measures. Although ex-members and never members are also more
positive where direct voice-only is present, the effects are much weaker. On
the crucial issue of fair treatment, union members are more positive about
management where there is direct voice-only than if there is representative
voice present (whether in isolation or in combination with direct voice). In
contrast, ex-members’ and never members’ perceptions of fair treatment are
unaffected by the availability of voice mechanisms.
The bottom half of the table indicates that the association between poor
perceptions of management and union-only voice is almost wholly confined
to union members. Union-voice – whether single channel, or in combination
with non-union voice – is only ever significantly associated with poorer
perceptions of management responsiveness among members.37 What’s more,
in the case of union members, single-channel union voice or representative
voice was associated with even poorer perceptions of management than in
instances in which there was no voice at all. This suggests that the negative
association between poor perceptions of management and union voice is
largely accounted for by voice-induced complaining, or the higher level of
‘critical awareness’ referred to by Freeman and Medoff, rather than ineffec-
tiveness on the part of union voice per se.
The most striking finding, however, is the ineffectiveness of all voice mecha-
nisms, compared to a situation in which employees have no voice. Only in the
case of never members was voice associated with better perceptions of manage-
ment. Never members were more positive about management’s ability to keep
them up-to-date, give them the chance to comment on proposals, respond to
suggestions, and deal with problems where there was a combination of repre-
sentative and direct voice, as opposed to no voice. None of the voice
mechanisms outperformed ‘no voice’ when it came to improving perceptions of
management’s fair treatment of employees, regardless of membership status.
What is actually happening on the ground becomes clearer when we
distinguish between union membership effects controlling for ‘workplace
effects’ associated with the unionisation of the workplace. We do this by
running models on four separate sub-samples: members in workplaces where
unions are recognised for pay bargaining; non-members in workplaces recog-
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 41
37 There is one exception, which is ex-members’ perception of the chance they are given to
comment on proposed changes. Here, both non-union only voice and dual-channel




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.nising unions; members in workplaces which do not recognise unions; and
non-members in workplaces which do not recognise unions.
Within workplaces where unions were not recognised by management for
pay bargaining purposes, representative voice alone (invariably non-union
representative voice) did not deliver for union members and non-members
alike (Table 14(a) for union members and 14(b) for non-members). Among
the small group of union members, there was a strong preference for direct
voice over representative voice. Further analysis revealed that this was due to
an antipathy towards non-union representative voice, rather than to union
voice which was weak due to its lack of real bargaining power through recog-
nition for pay bargaining. Non-members, on the other hand, responded most
positively to a combination of representative and direct voice. They also
responded more positively than union members to single-channel non-union
voice.
Turning to employees in workplaces recognising unions for pay bargain-
ing, union members perceived management as more responsive where
dual-channel communications were in place, as opposed to union-only repre-
sentation (Table 15(a)). However, dual-channel arrangements made no
difference to perceptions of the way in which management dealt with workers’
problems or the fairness with which they treated employees. Whether voice
involved union-only channels or dual-channel arrangements made no differ-
ence to non-members’ perceptions of managerial responsiveness in unionised
workplaces (Table 15(b)), perhaps because they did not participate in union
affairs. What did matter was whether there were direct methods of communi-
cation with management. Where they existed, non-members perceived
improvements in the opportunities management gave them to comment on
proposed change (as did members). But, unlike union members, the existence
of direct voice also improved non-union members’ perceptions of the way in
which management responded to suggestions and dealt with people’s work
problems. This suggests that within unionised workplaces direct voice was
complementing union representative voice by offering voice channels to
employees who did not have access to union channels.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analyses suggest that, if unions were ever able positively to influence
management’s behaviour in the eyes of workers, they are no longer doing so.
Rather, our findings are consistent with the view that unions highlight the
shortcomings of management, a process leading to more voluble complain-
ing. We find that ‘voice-induced complaining’ among union members
46 / Alex Brysonunderpins the seeming ineffectiveness of union voice relative to non-union
voice. Nevertheless, although British unions benefit employees in delivering a
sizeable wage mark-up, they appear unable to effect better workplace
management.
Whilst there is virtually no support for Freeman and Medoff’s proposi-
tion that union voice is more effective than non-union voice in delivering for
workers, proponents of direct communication between employees and
management as an integral part of human resource management can take
little comfort from the findings. In general, perceptions of management were
no better among employees with voice – whether it be union or non-union,
representative or direct – than they were among employees with no voice.
This was nowhere more apparent than in our analyses of what might be
viewed as the decisive test of effective voice, namely employees’ perceptions
of ‘fair treatment’ by management.
Where management made more intensive use of direct communication
channels, employees’ perceptions of management were better. This was the
case across all five of our measures, including ‘fair treatment’. Furthermore,
the use of particular types of direct voice – notably regular meetings between
senior management and the workforce and problem-solving groups – tended
to increase significantly perceptions of managerial responsiveness, while team
briefings did not. These findings held across many model specifications and
different sub-samples, suggesting that these effects are universal rather than
contingent upon specific circumstances. However, there were indications that
direct voice was particularly effective in a union setting, a finding that might
explain the growth of dual-channel arrangements in Britain over the last
twenty years. The combination of representative and direct voice significantly
improved perceptions of management across all five of our measures, includ-
ing ‘fair treatment’, suggesting some complementarity between representative
and direct voice in unionised workplaces. The effects were strongest among
union non-members, perhaps suggesting that direct voice was complementing
union representative voice by offering voice channels to employees who had
no access to union channels. There was no evidence that unions were in any
way impairing non-union voice effectiveness. On the contrary, a wider range
of direct voice mechanisms had positive effects in unionised workplaces than
was the case in non-unionised workplaces.
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Table A1:  Voice variables used in analysis
Column percentages
All Union Non-union
Union vs non-union voice:
Union-only 5 8 0
Dual-channel arrangements 54 92 4
Non-union only 34 0 79
No voice 7 0 17
Representative vs direct voice:
Representative voice only 11 14 6
Representative and direct voice 61 86 27
Direct voice only 21 0 50
No voice 7 0 17
Union voice:
UCHAN, any union voice channels 59 100 4
UCHANNEL, number of union channels
04 1 5 9
11 0 2 6
23 4 9 6
31 5 0 1 6
31 0
UNIONREC, if union recognised 
for pay bargaining 58 1 0
UREP2, on-site representative of 
recognised union 48 84 0
FTUREP, full-time on-site 
representative of recognised union 10 18 0
EXTUREP, off-site representative of 
recognised union (where no on-site rep) 3 6 0
JCTUAPP, union appointee to joint 
consultative committee 16 26 2
FJCCTUAP, union appointee to 
functioning joint consultative committee 14 23 1
UREPNREC, on-site union representative 
where no recognised union 1 0 3Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 51
Non-union voice:
NONUCHAN, number of direct non-union voice channels
01 8 1 4 2 3
13 5 3 2 3 8
23 6 4 2 2 8
31 1 1 2 1 1
NONUCHA2, number of direct and indirect non-union voice channels
01 2 8 1 7
12 6 2 2 3 1
22 9 3 1 2 7
32 3 2 9 1 5
49 9 9
51 1 1
NONUCHA3, if any direct or indirect 
non-union voice channels 88 92 83
DIRVOI, if any direct voice channels 82 86 77
REGMEET, if regular meetings between 
senior management and workforce 35 32 39
QCIRCLES, if any problem-solving groups 51 59 39
TBRIEF1, team briefings, broad definition 88 92 82
TBRIEF3, team briefings, 2-way 
communication, work-group defined, 
monthly 54 58 48
NONURVOI, if any non-union 
representative voice 46 55 33
NONUELEC, if any non-union elected 
employee representative on-site 7 5 10
Other representative voice variables:
REPVOI, any representative voice 72 1 33
JCC, if joint consultative committee 45 56 30
FUNCJCC, if joint consultative 
committee that meets at least once 
per month 38 49 24
JCCELEC, if employee representative 
to JCC elected by employees 21 25 14
FJCCELEC, if employee representative 
to FUNCJCC elected by employees 18 23 12
EUROWCUK, if European Works 
Council which operates in UK 9 10 7
Other communication variables:
MANCHAIN, if systematic use of 
management chain 70 79 57
NEWSLET, if regular newsletters 64 78 46
SUGGEST2, if suggestion schemes 41 48 32
OTHCONS, other consultation methods 20 24 15
Base: all employees with non-missing data in workplaces with 10 or more employees. Column 2
confined to employees in workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining. Column 3 confined
to employees in workplaces with no unions recognised for pay bargaining.52 / Alex Bryson





FEM, if female 49 48 52
ETHNIC, if non-white ethnic minority 4 4 4
AGE, in years:
Under 20 5 3 8
20–24 8 5 11
25–29 12 11 14
30–39 27 29 25
40–49 25 27 21
50–59 19 20 17
60+ 4 4 5
HEDQUAL, Highest educational qualification:
No qualifications 26 27 25
CSE or equivalent 12 12 13
GCSE or equivalent 26 26 27
A level or equivalent 15 14 15
Degree or equivalent 16 15 16
Post-graduate 5 6 5
VOCQUAL, if any vocational qualifications 37 38 36
MEMBTU, union membership status:
Current member 39 61 9
Ex-member 18 15 23
Never member 43 24 68
MEMREC, membership by workplace recognition:
Recognition, union member 35 61 0
Recognition, non-member 23 39 0
No recognition, member 4 0 9
No recognition, non-member 38 0 91
Job-related characteristics:
OCCGRP2, occupation:
Managers and senior administrators 9 8 10
Professional 11 12 10
Associate professional and technical 8 9 7
Clerical and secretarial 18 18 17
Craft and skilled service 10 11 9
Personal and protective service 12 12 12
Sales 9 6 14
Operative and assembly 13 15 11
Other occupations 10 10 11Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 53
TENURE, workplace tenure, in years:
Less than one 17 13 23
One, less than two 13 10 16
Two, less than five 23 22 24
Five, less than ten 22 23 20
Ten or more 26 32 17
HOURS, usual weekly hours:
Less than ten 5 4 6
Ten, less than twenty-nine 22 20 24
Thirty, less than thirty-nine 31 37 24
Forty, less than forty-eight 27 26 29
Forty-eight or more 15 14 18
PERM, if permanent contract 92 92 92
GROSSWAGE, gross weekly wage:
Less than £50 8 5 11
£51–80 7 5 10
£81–140 13 11 15
£141–180 9 8 11
£181–220 11 12 11
£221–260 10 11 10
£261–310 10 11 8
£311–360 8 9 6
£361–430 10 12 6
£431–540 7 8 6
£541–680 4 3 4
£681 or more 3 3 4
Workplace-level data:
Workforce composition:
PCMANFEM, percentage of workplace 
managers who are women 31 29 34
PCFEM, percentage of workforce 
who are women 49 48 51
PCMAN, percentage of workforce 
who are managers 8 7 10
PCPT, percentage of workforce who 
are part-timers 26 24 29
PCETHNIC, percentage of worforce 
from non-white ethnic minorities 4 4 4
NEMPSIZE, number of employees at workplace:
10–24 13 7 21
25–49 14 9 21
50–99 15 11 20
100–199 15 15 13
200–499 20 24 15
500 or more  24 34 9NDENSITY, percentage of workforce 
who are members of union 35 57 5
Sector, ownership and location:
PUBLIC, if public sector 31 48 8
ASINGLE, if multi-site organisation:
One of a number of UK sites 76 86 62
Single independent workplace 22 13 35
Sole UK site for foreign-based 
organisation 2 1 3
ASIC, standard industrial classification (single digit):
Manufacturing 23 26 20
Electricity, gas and water 1 1 0
Construction 3 3 4
Wholesale and retail distribution 15 9 22
Hotels and restaurants 4 1 9
Transport and communication 6 8 4
Financial services 4 5 3
Other business services 8 3 16
Public administration 9 15 1
Education 10 12 8
Health 13 16 10
Other community services 3 3 4
SSR, Standard statistical region:
East Anglia 5 5 6
East Midlands 9 9 8
London 10 9 11
North 7 9 4
North West 10 11 9
Scotland 10 13 7
Rest of South East 18 13 26
South West 8 9 8
Wales 4 5 3
West Midlands 10 11 9
Yorkshire and Humberside 8 7 9
Workplace activity:
KACTIVI, activity at the workplace:
Produce goods or services for customers 53 55 50
Supplier of goods or services to other 
companies 22 15 33
Supplier of goods or services to other 
parts of organisation to which we belong 7 11 3
Do not produce goods or services for 
sale in open market 14 17 10
Administrative office only 4 3 5
54 / Alex BrysonManagement practices:
BSTRATEG, if workplace is covered 
by a formal strategic plan 85 92 75
BAWARD, if workplace or organisation 
to which it belongs has been 
accredited as an Investor in People 35 39 29
WRITPOL, if workplace has a 
formal written policy on equal 
opportunities or managing diversity 81 91 66
Base: all employees with non-missing data in workplaces with 10 or more employees. Column 2
confined to employees in workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining. Column 3 confined
to employees in workplaces with no unions recognised for pay bargaining.
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 55Table A3(a): Representative and direct voice arrangements and employee
perceptions of management
Up to date Chance Respond Dealing Fairly
Voice: (ref = representative voice only)
Representative and direct 0.160 0.221 0.140 0.115 0.097
(3.48)** (4.82)** (3.18)** (2.67)** (2.22)*
Direct only 0.132 0.161 0.121 0.111 0.079
(2.26)* (2.85)** (2.09)* (1.96)* (1.41)
No voice 0.062 0.103 0.042 0.022 0.028
(0.80) (1.32) (0.54) (0.32) (0.39)
Female 0.043 0.065 0.113 0.021 –0.014
(1.61) (2.27)* (4.11)** (0.78) (0.56)
Age: (ref = 30–39 years)
Under 20 0.133 0.097 0.031 0.093 0.005
(2.36)* (1.84) (0.52) (1.52) (0.08)
20–24 years 0.148 0.140 0.132 0.176 0.101
(3.37)** (3.17)** (2.86)** (3.70)** (2.20)*
25–29 years 0.016 –0.005 0.046 0.065 0.027
(0.44) (0.14) (1.16) (1.67) (0.80)
40–49 years 0.035 –0.010 0.006 –0.015 0.000
(1.39) (0.37) (0.23) (0.56) (0.02)
50–59 years 0.119 0.057 0.054 0.070 0.122
(3.28)** (1.45) (1.42) (1.72) (3.05)**
60+ years 0.329 0.296 0.240 0.271 0.387
(5.68)** (5.57)** (4.25)** (4.81)** (6.53)**
Highest educational qualification (ref = GCSE or equivalent)
No educational qualifications 0.107 0.111 0.104 0.153 0.145
(3.57)** (3.42)** (2.91)** (4.44)** (4.58)**
CSE or equivalent 0.133 0.144 0.133 0.125 0.108
(3.83)** (4.21)** (3.49)** (3.46)** (3.17)**
A level or equivalent –0.050 –0.057 –0.054 –0.042 –0.043
(1.73) (1.76) (1.61) (1.30) (1.42)
Degree of equivalent –0.058 –0.018 –0.061 –0.076 –0.049
(1.65) (0.47) (1.60) (1.98)* (1.22)
Post-graduate –0.094 –0.053 –0.118 –0.123 –0.140
(1.91) (1.05) (2.26)* (2.41)* (2.75)**
If possesses vocational  –0.037 –0.070 –0.020 –0.030 –0.062
qualification (1.73) (3.24)** (0.95) (1.40) (2.89)**
Member of non-white  0.108 0.057 0.040 –0.007 –0.059
ethnic minority (1.69) (0.97) (0.70) (0.11) (0.94)
Union membership (ref = current member)
Ex-member 0.019 0.026 0.047 0.045 0.072
(0.58) (0.77) (1.30) (1.42) (2.33)*
Never member 0.088 0.088 0.126 0.154 0.183
(2.84)** (2.53)* (3.23)** (5.11)** (6.06)**
56 / Alex BrysonOccupational classification (ref = clerical and secretarial)
Managers and senior  0.300 0.324 0.296 0.294 0.311
administrators (5.72)** (6.73)** (6.41)** (6.15)** (5.51)**
Professional 0.036 0.074 0.068 0.036 –0.018
(0.69) (1.52) (1.34) (0.76) (0.38)
Associate professional and  0.047 0.070 0.104 0.022 –0.018
technical (1.02) (1.50) (2.03)* (0.43) (0.35)
Craft and skilled service –0.102 –0.070 –0.176 –0.165 –0.233
(2.14)* (1.39) (3.45)** (3.23)** (4.70)**
Personal and protective  0.049 0.038 0.057 0.081 –0.004
service (0.98) (0.78) (1.05) (1.69) (0.09)
Sales 0.096 0.056 0.077 0.054 –0.052
(1.61) (0.96) (1.32) (0.94) (0.97)
Operative and assembly –0.083 –0.089 –0.165 –0.145 –0.206
(1.60) (1.68) (3.02)** (3.06)** (4.47)**
Other occupation –0.018 –0.043 –0.089 –0.085 –0.167
(0.34) (0.78) (1.35) (1.58) (3.04)**
Workplace tenure (ref = 10 + years)
Less than 1 year 0.406 0.437 0.440 0.427 0.479
(11.02)** (11.48)** (10.78)** (11.12)** (12.40)**
1, < 2 years 0.194 0.223 0.220 0.224 0.244
(4.91)** (5.71)** (5.83)** (5.72)** (6.34)**
2, < 5 years 0.044 0.065 0.074 0.082 0.131
(1.36) (1.98)* (2.32)* (2.40)* (4.20)**
5, <10 years 0.000 0.021 0.017 0.011 0.043
(0.02) (0.68) (0.55) (0.36) (1.41)
If permanent employment  –0.030 0.003 –0.042 –0.012 –0.007
contract (0.77) (0.08) (1.01) (0.27) (0.18)
Usual weekly hours (ref = less than 10)
10, < 29 hours –0.056 –0.017 0.020 0.060 –0.035
(0.77) (0.24) (0.21) (0.80) (0.46)
30, < 39 hours –0.074 –0.011 0.002 0.044 –0.142
(0.91) (0.13) (0.02) (0.54) (1.72)
40, < 48 hours –0.048 –0.002 0.066 0.066 –0.124
(0.60) (0.03) (0.60) (0.78) (1.47)
48 hours or more –0.077 –0.016 0.007 –0.003 –0.188
(0.91) (0.18) (0.06) (0.04) (2.08)*
Gross weekly wage (ref = £141–180)
£50 or less 0.157 0.126 0.198 0.207 0.199
(1.87) 0.284 0.299 (2.31)* (2.63)**
£51–80 0.118 0.114 0.112 0.079 –0.001
(1.88) (1.94) (1.74) (1.25) (0.02)
£81–140 0.069 0.054 0.065 0.063 0.044
(1.59) (1.30) (1.44) (1.24) (0.92)
£181–220 0.050 0.061 0.059 0.041 0.020
(1.14) (1.42) (1.39) (0.95) (0.47)
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 57£221–260 0.030 0.049 0.007 –0.016 –0.011
(0.63) (0.96) (0.15) (0.34) (0.24)
£261–310 0.095 0.107 0.063 0.050 0.085
(2.03)* (2.29)* (1.31) (1.06) (1.84)
£311–360 0.078 0.084 0.057 0.106 0.146
(1.32) (1.49) (1.00) (2.02)* 2.79)**
£361–430 0.109 0.083 0.112 0.089 0.161
(1.93) (1.50) (1.89) (1.48) (3.34)**
£431–540 0.166 0.126 0.147 0.130 0.209
(2.85)** (2.11)* (2.23)* (1.99)* (3.68)**
£541–680 0.207 (1.55) (2.09)* 0.194 0.298
(2.68)** (3.82)** (3.91)** (2.65)** (4.51)**
£681 or more 0.371 0.329 0.319 0.268 0.509
(4.81)** (4.12)** (3.85)** (3.07)** (6.53)**
Number of employees at workplace (ref = 100–199)
10–24 0.156 0.301 0.250 0.227 0.217
(2.60)** (5.01)** (4.32)** (3.93)** (4.06)**
25–49 0.050 0.085 0.091 0.078 0.087
(0.99) (1.66) (1.81) (1.73) (1.97)*
50–99 0.089 0.092 0.093 0.115 0.085
(1.94) (2.02)* (2.07)* (2.77)** (2.09)*
200–499 –0.015 0.000 0.006 0.030 0.016
(0.36) (0.00) (0.15) (0.82) (0.44)
500 or more 0.015 0.017 0.024 0.019 0.017
(0.39) (0.40) (0.56) (0.48) (0.49)
Percentage of managers  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
who are female (2.60)** (2.88)** (2.32)* (1.23) (1.96)
Percentage of employees  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
who are female (0.93) (0.55) (0.89) (1.39) (0.16)
Percentage of employees  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
who are part-time (2.40)* (1.81) (2.25)* (1.74) (2.73)**
Percentage of employees  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
who are non-white (1.39) (2.07)* (1.38) (1.00) (0.18)
Percentage of employees  0.001 0.002 0.001 –0.001 –0.001
who are managers (0.42) (1.06) (0.61) (0.74) (0.60)
If public sector –0.066 –0.006 –0.041 –0.008 –0.018
(1.35) (0.13) (0.82) (0.17) (0.39)
Single or multi-site organisation (ref = one of a number of UK sites)
Single independent  –0.060 –0.064 0.015 0.005 0.030
workplace (1.47) (1.52) (0.35) (0.15) (0.80)
Sole UK site for foreign  0.115 0.219 0.271 0.143 0.196
organisation (1.33) (2.53)* (2.94)** (1.71) (2.35)*
Industry (ref = manufacturing)
Electricity, gas and water 0.051 0.017 0.062 0.114 0.071
(0.82) (0.24) (0.84) (2.02)* (1.13)
Construction 0.012 –0.002 0.068 0.130 0.123
(0.18) (0.03) (0.99) (1.98)* (1.85)
58 / Alex BrysonWholesale and retail  –0.155 –0.159 –0.182 –0.090 –0.077
distribution (2.30)* (2.36)* (2.48)* (1.39) (1.24)
Hotels and restaurants 0.043 –0.019 0.003 0.067 0.067
(0.49) (0.24) (0.04) (0.77) (0.91)
Transport and 0.006 –0.051 –0.155 –0.038 –0.051
communication (0.11) (0.94) (2.61)** (0.72) (0.97)
Financial services 0.176 0.159 0.122 0.084 0.048
(2.92)** (2.43)* (1.84) (1.45) (0.80)
Other business services –0.011 0.007 –0.046 0.032 0.030
(0.19) (0.11) (0.74) (0.59) (0.58)
Public administration 0.113 0.116 –0.022 0.074 0.077
(1.43) (1.56) (0.29) (1.10) (1.21)
Education 0.189 0.232 0.097 0.156 0.160
(2.39)* (3.02)** (1.20) (2.13)* (2.30)*
Health 0.026 0.073 –0.084 –0.026 –0.022
(0.33) (0.91) (1.04) (0.35) (0.32)
Other community services –0.009 –0.054 –0.099 –0.008 0.024
(0.10) (0.60) (1.14) (0.10) (0.32)
Activity at the workplace (ref = produces goods or services for customers)
Supplier to other companies –0.073 –0.046 0.019 –0.036 –0.056
(1.74) (1.05) (0.43) (0.93) (1.54)
Supplier to other parts of  –0.025 –0.062 –0.009 –0.033 –0.036
organisation (0.44) (1.21) (0.13) (0.68) (0.74)
Does not produce for  0.066 0.041 0.088 0.029 0.064
open market (1.58) (0.94) (1.89) (0.68) (1.68)
Administrative office only –0.022 –0.021 0.042 0.036 0.022
(0.37) (0.30) (0.71) (0.66) (0.40)
If workplace has formal  0.073 0.049 0.064 0.038 0.065
strategic plan (1.70) (1.13) (1.55) (1.03) (1.67)
If Investor in People  0.099 0.090 0.086 0.062 0.082
accredited (3.37)** (2.87)** (2.66)** (2.20)* (3.15)*
If written policy on  0.124 0.091 0.040 0.038 0.015
equal opportunities (2.72)** (1.94) (0.86) (0.97) (0.35)
Region (ref = rest of South East)
East Anglia 0.014 0.009 0.002 0.023 0.015
(0.24) 0.052 (0.03) 0.030 (0.25)
East Midlands 0.117 0.074 0.140 0.150 0.149
(2.31)* (1.49) (2.47)* (3.09)** (3.30)**
London 0.091 0.051 0.014 0.038 0.050
(1.67) (0.88) (0.24) (0.64) (1.01)
North 0.112 0.118 0.104 0.108 0.128
(2.03)* (2.09)* (1.73) (2.15)* (2.29)*
North West 0.085 0.085 0.075 0.066 0.091
(1.53) (1.46) (1.53) (1.40) (1.90)
Scotland 0.058 0.036 –0.009 0.000 0.069
(1.09) (0.72) (0.17) (0.01) (1.51)
South West 0.153 0.113 0.102 0.163 0.205
(2.52)* (2.13)* (1.88) (3.34)** 3.84)**
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 59Wales 0.058 0.026 0.019 0.125 0.097
(0.73) (0.34) (0.26) (1.67) (1.4)
West Midlands 0.023 –0.006 –0.046 0.003 0.054
(0.40) (0.10) (0.64) (0.06) (1.07)
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.096 (0.13) –0.011 (0.33) 0.000
(1.65) (0.97) (0.20) (0.60) (0.00)
Observations 21281 20989 20615 21021 21139
Notes:
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5per cent; ** significant at 1per cent
60 / Alex BrysonTable A3(b): Union and non-union voice arrangements and employee
perceptions of management
Up to date Chance Respond Dealing Fairly
Voice: (ref =union voice only)
Union and non-union 0.082 0.139 0.069 0.060 0.051
(1.48) (2.40)* (1.20) (1.12) (0.93)
Non-union only 0.145 0.189 0.114 0.117 0.096
(2.38)* (2.99)** (1.75) (1.92) (1.57)
No voice 0.057 0.104 0.025 0.020 0.032
(0.71) (1.24) (0.29) (0.27) (0.42)
Female 0.042 0.064 0.112 0.021 –0.015
(1.57) (2.24)* (4.06)** (0.75) (0.58)
Age: (ref = 30–39 years)
Under 20 0.135 0.100 0.033 0.095 0.007
(2.40)* (1.89) (0.56) (1.56) (0.11)
20–24 years 0.150 0.142 0.134 0.178 0.102
(3.42)** (3.20)** (2.89)** (3.73)** (2.23)*
25–29 years 0.019 –0.002 0.048 0.067 0.029
(0.51) (0.05) (1.20) (1.72) (0.85)
40–49 years 0.034 –0.011 0.005 –0.015 –0.002
(1.34) (0.41) (0.19) (0.57) (0.06)
50–59 years 0.117 0.056 0.054 0.070 0.120
(3.25)** (1.41) (1.40) (1.71) (3.02)**
60+ years 0.330 0.298 0.243 0.273 0.389
(5.71)** (5.63)** (4.30)** (4.86)** (6.59)**
Highest educational qualification (ref = GCSE or equivalent)
No educational qualifications 0.110 0.114 0.106 0.155 0.147
(3.67)** (3.50)** (2.97)** (4.53)** (4.65)**
CSE or equivalent 0.135 0.147 0.135 0.128 0.110
(3.90)** (4.30)** (3.54)** (3.52)** (3.21)**
A level or equivalent –0.050 –0.058 –0.055 –0.043 –0.044
(1.75) (1.79) (1.63) (1.30) (1.45)
Degree or equivalent –0.060 –0.020 –0.063 –0.078 –0.051
(1.71) (0.53) (1.66) (2.02)* (1.27)
Post-graduate –0.099 –0.057 –0.124 –0.128 –0.142
(2.02)* (1.13) (2.36)* (2.49)* (2.80)**
If possesses vocational –0.037 –0.070 –0.020 –0.030 –0.062
qualification (1.77) (3.23)** (0.95) (1.41) (2.91)**
Member of non-white  0.110 0.059 0.041 –0.006 –0.058
ethnic minority (1.69) (0.99) (0.70) (0.09) (0.93)
Union membership (ref = current member)
Ex-member –0.001 0.003 0.033 0.030 0.059
(0.04) (0.09) (0.89) (0.93) (1.88)
Never member 0.064 0.062 0.109 0.136 0.165
(2.06)* (1.74) (2.82)** (4.52)** (5.42)**
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 61Occupational classification (ref = clerical and secretarial)
Managers and senior  0.300 0.325 0.297 0.294 0.311
administrators (5.75)** (6.75)** (6.44)** (6.15)** (5.50)**
Professional 0.035 0.071 0.068 0.035 –0.021
(0.66) (1.46) (1.35) (0.73) (0.46)
Associate professional  0.041 0.062 0.100 0.019 –0.022
and technical (0.87) (1.33) (1.96)* (0.36) (0.42)
Craft and skilled service –0.106 –0.074 –0.179 –0.167 –0.234
(2.21)* (1.46) (3.51)** (3.28)** (4.71)**
Personal and protective  0.047 0.035 0.055 0.079 –0.006
service (0.94) (0.73) (1.01) (1.66) (0.12)
Sales 0.090 0.049 0.074 0.050 –0.056
(1.51) (0.84) (1.25) (0.88) (1.05)
Operative and assembly –0.089 –0.095 –0.170 –0.151 –0.210
(1.73) (1.81) (3.12)** (3.19)** (4.57)**
Other occupation –0.020 –0.047 –0.090 –0.087 –0.168
(0.39) (0.87) (1.37) (1.63) (3.05)**
Workplace tenure (ref = 10 + years)
Less than 1 year 0.405 0.436 0.440 0.428 0.478
(10.99)** (11.44)** (10.78)** (11.12)** (12.37)**
1, < 2 years 0.196 0.225 0.222 0.226 0.244
(4.95)** (5.76)** (5.88)** (5.77)** (6.35)**
2, < 5 years 0.046 0.069 0.076 0.085 0.133
(1.44) (2.10)* (2.38)* (2.46)* (4.23)**
5, <10 years –0.001 0.021 0.017 0.011 0.042
(0.05) (0.66) (0.55) (0.36) (1.40)
If permanent employment  –0.035 –0.003 –0.045 –0.016 –0.009
contract (0.88) (0.07) (1.08) (0.37) (0.23)
Usual weekly hours (ref = less than 10)
10, < 29 hours –0.058 –0.019 0.019 0.059 –0.036
(0.79) (0.26) (0.20) (0.79) (0.48)
30, < 39 hours –0.077 –0.014 0.000 0.041 –0.145
(0.95) (0.17) (0.00) (0.51) (1.76)
40, < 48 hours –0.056 –0.010 0.060 0.059 –0.130
(0.69) (0.12) (0.55) (0.70) (1.54)
48 hours or more –0.088 –0.026 –0.002 –0.012 –0.196
(1.03) (0.29) (0.01) (0.13) (2.17)*
Gross weekly wage (ref = £141–180)
£50 or less 0.160 0.131 0.201 0.209 0.201
(1.90) 0.293 0.307 0.200 (2.64)**
£51–80 0.121 0.119 0.116 0.081 0.000
(1.92) (2.01)* (1.80) (1.27) (0.01)
£81–140 0.073 0.060 0.069 0.066 0.047
(1.69) (1.43) (1.55) (1.30) (0.99)
£181–220 0.052 0.063 0.062 0.043 0.021
(1.20) (1.47) (1.44) (0.98) (0.50)
62 / Alex Bryson£221–260 0.037 0.057 0.013 –0.011 –0.007
(0.77) (1.11) (0.27) (0.23) (0.15)
£261–310 0.101 0.112 0.068 0.054 0.087
(2.15)* (2.41)* (1.41) (1.13) (1.89)
£311–360 0.084 0.090 0.062 0.110 0.149
(1.43) (1.61) (1.10) (2.11)* (2.86)**
£361–430 0.119 0.093 0.120 0.096 0.166
(2.10)* (1.68) (2.01)* (1.58) (3.45)**
£431–540 0.173 0.133 0.152 0.136 0.214
(2.98)** (2.24)* (2.31)* (2.08)* (3.77)**
£541–680 0.215 (1.60) (2.11)* (2.32)* 0.303
(2.80)** (3.96)** (4.05)** (2.73)** (4.57)**
£681 or more 0.381 0.337 0.328 0.276 0.516
(4.97)** (4.24)** (3.99)** (3.17)** (6.65)**
Number of employees at workplace (ref = 100–199)
10–24 0.139 0.279 0.238 0.218 0.206
(2.35)* (4.79)** (4.14)** (3.84)** (3.87)**
25–49 0.032 0.062 0.078 0.068 0.076
(0.63) (1.19) (1.55) (1.48) (1.70)
50–99 0.079 0.078 0.086 0.109 0.079
(1.71) (1.70) (1.89) (2.60)** (1.95)
200–499 –0.027 –0.016 –0.004 0.023 0.008
(0.64) (0.39) (0.09) (0.61) (0.22)
500 or more 0.021 0.023 0.029 0.023 0.022
(0.54) (0.51) (0.66) (0.60) (0.64)
Percentage of managers  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
who are female (2.46)* (2.74)** (2.27)* (1.17) (1.86)
Percentage of employees  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
who are female (1.00) (0.69) (0.93) (1.44) (0.24)
Percentage of employees  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
who are part-time (2.40)* (1.82) (2.26)* (1.76) (2.73)**
Percentage of employees  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
who are non-white (1.37) (1.95) (1.39) (1.08) (0.36)
Percentage of employees  0.000 0.001 0.001 –0.001 –0.001
who are managers (0.26) (0.95) (0.49) (0.91) (0.73)
If public sector –0.053 0.006 –0.034 0.001 –0.010
(1.06) (0.12) (0.66) (0.02) (0.21)
Single or multi-site organisation (ref = one of a number of UK sites)
Single independent  –0.066 –0.072 0.010 0.000 0.026
workplace (1.62) (1.70) (0.24) (0.01) (0.69)
Sole UK site for  0.102 0.200 0.263 0.134 0.187
foreign organisation (1.16) (2.30)* (2.79)** (1.55) (2.21)*
Industry (ref = manufacturing)
Electricity, gas and water 0.064 0.030 0.072 0.124 0.083
(1.04) (0.43) (0.99) (2.21)* (1.33)
Construction 0.005 –0.010 0.064 0.126 0.119
(0.08) (0.15) (0.92) (1.91) (1.79)
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 63Wholesale and retail  –0.176 –0.183 –0.197 –0.106 –0.090
distribution (2.55)* (2.61)** (2.63)** (1.59) (1.43)
Hotels and restaurants 0.016 –0.049 –0.015 0.047 0.049
(0.18) (0.61) (0.17) (0.54) (0.64)
Transport and  –0.008 –0.068 –0.167 –0.048 –0.058
communication (0.14) (1.25) (2.77)** (0.91) (1.10)
Financial services 0.181 0.164 0.127 0.088 0.051
(3.01)** (2.50)* (1.92) (1.54) (0.88)
Other business services –0.041 –0.027 –0.066 0.011 0.009
(0.65) (0.41) (1.02) (0.20) (0.17)
Public administration 0.110 0.109 –0.023 0.072 0.079
(1.40) (1.46) (0.31) (1.06) (1.23)
Education 0.193 0.239 0.103 0.158 0.165
(2.45)* (3.05)** (1.25) (2.16)* (2.36)*
Health 0.013 0.054 –0.093 –0.035 –0.029
(0.16) (0.65) (1.13) (0.47) (0.40)
Other community services –0.012 –0.064 –0.098 –0.012 0.025
(0.14) (0.69) (1.12) (0.15) (0.33)
Activity at the workplace (ref = produces goods or services for customers)
Supplier to other companies –0.075 –0.048 0.018 –0.037 –0.057
(1.79) (1.10) (0.40) (0.96) (1.57)
Supplier to other parts of  –0.022 –0.059 –0.007 –0.031 –0.036
organisation (0.39) (1.14) (0.10) (0.63) (0.74)
Does not produce for  0.062 0.038 0.085 0.026 0.059
open market (1.48) (0.87) (1.84) (0.61) (1.55)
Administrative office only –0.023 –0.020 0.043 0.036 0.021
(0.38) (0.29) (0.72) (0.67) (0.39)
If workplace has formal  0.082 0.062 0.072 0.044 0.072
strategic plan (1.86) (1.37) (1.70) (1.14) (1.83)
If Investor in People  0.106 0.099 0.092 0.068 0.088
accredited (3.56)** (3.05)** (2.80)* (2.35)* (3.32)**
If written policy on equal  0.125 0.091 0.040 0.039 0.015
opportunities (2.72)** (1.92) (0.86) (0.98) (0.35)
Region (ref = rest of South East)
East Anglia 0.027 0.022 0.013 0.032 0.023
(0.46) (0.32) (0.19) (0.46) 0.002
East Midlands 0.130 0.088 0.150 0.160 0.159
(2.55)* (1.75) (2.65)** (3.28)** (3.50)**
London 0.088 0.046 0.011 0.036 0.049
(1.62) (0.79) (0.19) (0.61) (0.99)
North 0.120 0.127 0.109 0.114 0.134
(2.12)* (2.16)* (1.81) (2.26)* (2.41)*
North West 0.091 0.088 0.078 0.071 0.096
(1.62) (1.49) (1.60) (1.49) (1.98)*
Scotland 0.063 0.040 –0.005 0.005 0.074
(1.18) (0.78) (0.10) (0.11) (1.62)
South West 0.162 0.120 0.108 0.170 0.211
(2.69)** (2.30)* (2.02)* (3.51)** (3.98)**
64 / Alex BrysonWales 0.065 0.031 0.026 0.132 0.103
(0.82) (0.41) (0.34) (1.77) (1.57)
West Midlands 0.037 0.006 –0.035 0.014 0.066
(0.63) (0.09) (0.48) (0.23) (1.27)
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.096 0.049 –0.012 0.030 (0.40)
(1.65) (0.89) (0.22) (0.59) (0.04)
Observations 21254 20961 20590 20997 21111
Notes:
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5per cent; ** significant at 1per cent
Have British Workers Lost Their Voice? / 65